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Abstract This paper examines the welfare effects of physically interconnecting
two (network) markets that were previously separated. In each market a different
set of capacity-constrained firms operate. Firms engage in a supergame and collude
whenever it is rational for them to do so.We find that, under certain parametric restric-
tions, interconnection of the two markets reduces total welfare. The collusive horizon
may extend from a single market to the overall integrated market. In such case, inter-
connection can be viewed as “exporting” collusion, rather than competition.
Keywords Capacity constraints · Collusion · Market interconnection
JEL Classification L11 · L40 · F15
1 Introduction
A strong inclination towards market integration and physical interconnection has char-
acterized the European Union policy in the last twenty years at least. It is supported
by a number of studies, both in industrial organization and in international trade, that
recognize market integration and interoperability as a source of welfare (see, e.g.,
Krugman and Obstfeld 2004; Markusen 1981).
These theoretical works stress the benefits of integration, in terms of higher produc-
tive efficiency—through exploitation of economies of scale—and lower prices due to
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greater competition (see, for instance, Emerson et al. 1988). However, on the empiri-
cal side, the issue is much less clear, and the evidence on the actual welfare effects of
physical interconnection, which we will describe in greater details in the next section,
is ambiguous.
Our paper finds conditions under which openness and physical interconnection,
contrary to the conventional view, facilitate collusion and reduce welfare.1 In building
our framework, we target network markets, and, in particular, electricity; the insights
of the models may, however, naturally be applied to other sectors as well.
Our results depend on two crucial assumptions: First, the productive capacity of
competing firms is limited. Second, firms collude whenever it is rational for them to
do so. Both assumptions fit utilities markets, and, specifically, electricity. Generators’
capacity in electricity is generally bounded; furthermore, transactions in electricity
generation are often centralized in spot markets, where firms interact frequently, and
information on firm’s strategic variables is easily available. These features hint at the
prospect of a market with a high collusive potential.
Under these circumstances, improved physical interconnection may bring about
not only greater competition, but greater collusion as well. The core of the argument
is the following: Without integration, one market may be characterised by a collu-
sive (monopoly) price, while in the other one, capacity may be so large that such an
outcome is impossible. However, when the markets are interconnected, the “excess”
capacity in the second market may be diverted to the first one. Monopoly price might
thus prevail in the integrated market, so that monopoly would be “exported” from the
first market to the second one. When each firm’s individual capacity is smaller than
aggregate output at the prevailing collusive market price, each firm’s deviation profit
from the collusive agreement2 is limited by the capacity constraint. As a consequence,
in addition to the discount factor, it is the relation between aggregate capacity and the
market size, and not the number of firms alone (as we have in the standard setting,
without capacity constraints), that determines whether or not the monopoly outcome
can emerge as an equilibrium of the collusive game.
1.1 Motivating evidence and literature review
The available evidence on the effects of interconnection is mixed, as documented by
a recent report by the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI 2007) on European
countries. In many episodes, the actual outcome of market opening has been disap-
pointing. In the early stages of market integration in electricity generation in Italy
(April 2004–January 2005), for instance, wholesale prices were liberalised, and the
market was opened in the hope of importing competition from abroad. On the contrary,
prices in neighbouring countries (namely, France) rose, and converged upward to the
Italian level, in a situation where fuel prices were possibly relevant in Italy, but not so
much in France (where nuclear power generation is paramount). The Italian electric-
1 Observe that the possibility that trade reduces welfare in one of the countries involved is well known in
the literature (see, e.g., a standard textbook such as Krugman and Obstfeld 2004). However, our result is
that the aggregate welfare effect in the two countries is negative.
2 Deviation occurs through undercutting the rivals.
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ity generation market has often been suspected of a collusive structure, and several
investigations opened by the national antitrust authority3 reflect these concerns. The
French system operates on similar bases. Before interconnection, France had a larger
excess capacity than Italy, and thus sellers were unable to enforce a monopolistic
collusion; after integration, the French capacity has been partly diverted to the Italian
market, thereby reducing its excess capacity, and allowing French firms to increase the
equilibrium price. An hypothesis is that the Italian collusion has been “exported” to
the French market as well, through a mechanism possibly similar to the one illustrated
in our paper.
Our result is somewhat related to the multimarket contact argument illustrated by
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) (BW henceafter). They analyze a situation where the
same firms are allowed to operate in various markets, which, in spite of remaining
physically separated, have a (partly) common supply side.4 BW find that multimarket
contacts may make collusion easier to sustain, thereby lowering welfare.
Although similar in spirit (both their paper and ours identify channels through
which collusion may be transferred across markets), the two papers differ in two main
respects. First, the type of channel that is employed to spread collusion: capacity con-
straints in our paper, differences in the discount factor and in the number of firms across
markets in theirs.5 Second, BW find that multimarket contacts weakly increase the
scope for collusion; our paper, on the contrary, shows that, depending to the parameter
values, collusion may be favored or hampered by interconnection.
Our paper relates also to a wide literature on collusion and capacity constraints (in
a single market). Brock and Scheinkman (1985) (BS henceafter) point out the role
of aggregate capacity in determining the threat after a deviation. Given individual
capacity levels, when aggregate capacity (the number of firms) is sufficiently low, and
some firms are essential for producing the competitive outcome, Bertrand equilibrium
involves positive profits (see Kreps and Scheinkman 1983). In such situations, the
threat posed by deviating from collusion becomes less effective, making collusion
harder to achieve. As capacity increases and hits the point at which no firm is essential
3 See, e.g., the provision A366 (April 2005) of the Italian antitrust authority on the electricity exchange or
I530 on the relationships between Enel and Endesa Italia.
4 For a review of the literature on multimarket contacts and their adverse welfare effects, see Van Wegberg
et al. (1994).
5 The industrial organization literature has identified a further alternative channel (with respect both to that
proposed in our paper and to BW’s) through which physical interconnection is conducive to welfare reduc-
tion, related to price discrimination. Indeed, third degree price discrimination is feasible in a two-market
environment, while it is not in an integrated market framework, where a no-arbitrage condition ensures
the prevalence of a uniform price. The welfare effect of third-degree price discrimination is ambiguous.
In particular, under monopoly, discrimination may be welfare-enhancing, when it leads to an increase in
output sufficient to offset the drawbacks due to unequal marginal utilities - see Varian (1989) for a survey of
price discrimination with monopoly. Under linear demand, a condition for price discrimination to improve
welfare is that without price discrimination one of the two markets would not be served; that is, the will-
ingness to pay across the two markets is so different that, with a uniform price after interconnection, only
consumers of the market with the higher willingness to pay are served. Conditions of welfare reduction
related to third degree price discrimination appear particularly restrictive, and do not seem to fit any of the
utilities markets.
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to produce the competitive output, Bertrand equilibrium involves zero profit, while
the output produced immediately after deviation is bounded by capacity.
For these reasons, BS find that, for a fixed capacity per firm, changes in the number
of firms have a non-monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price. Our paper
extensively applies BS’s insights to the market integration context.
The subsequent literature includes many variations of their framework of collu-
sion under capacity constraints. Davidson and Deneckere (1990) and Penard (1997)
endogenize firms’ capacity choices. Lambson (1987) examines optimal punishment
paths. Staiger and Wolak (1992) and Fabra (2006) illustrate the impact of demand
fluctuations. Finally, an extensive literature (see, e.g., Barla 2000 and Compte et al.
2002) explicitly analyze asymmetric capacity.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section provides a motivating exam-
ple that illustrates the contribution of our paper. Sect. 3 illustrates the basic model
and derives equilibrium prices with separated markets. Sect. 4 derives the equilibrium
prices for integrated markets and the consequent welfare comparison for the integrated
and unintegrated cases. The final section contains some concluding remarks.
2 A numerical example
Consider two separate countries, each with the same linear demand function pr = a −
Qr , where Qr is the aggregate quantity and pr is the price in market r . All firms have
zero marginal cost and can produce up to capacity k = a3 .
Firms operate with an infinite time horizon and discount future profits at a factor
δ = 34 , common to all firms.
In the first country, four identical firms operate. These firms may form a cartel, and,
by assumption, select the “best” (i.e., the one maximizing aggregate profit) equilib-
rium pair (price and quantity) in a supergame supported by a Bertrand-Nash reversion
trigger strategy.
The individual rationality (henceafter, IR) constraint, when firm i is capacity con-
strained (and the collusive output exceeds individual capacity k), requires the profit
from a small (ε → 0) deviation from the cartel price6 pc to be smaller than the profit
from remaining in the cartel and producing qi . It differs from the IR constraint of
a collusive supergame in which firms have unlimited capacity, in that capacity con-
straints here bind the deviation output, thereby limiting the deviation profit (at a level
of pck). This suggests that collusion may be easier to sustain when firms are capacity
constrained (see Brock and Scheinkman 1985).
Formally, the sustainability of the cartel requires the following individual rationality
(IR) constraint to hold for each of the four firms:
pcqi (pc)
1 − δ ≥ kp
c ⇒ q
i (pc)
1 − δ ≥ k =
a
3
(1)
6 Notice that the capacity of the firms is such that none of the firms is essential to produce the competitive
output. Hence, the static Bertrand equilibrium prescribes zero profit, as will be explained in greater detail
later.
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qi ≥ (1 − δ) a
3
= a
12
(2)
Therefore, a firm will find it optimal to remain within the cartel only if its production
is not lower than a12 .
Therefore, the minimum aggregate sustainable output in the first country, a3 , is
lower than the monopoly output a2 . Hence, the monopoly outcome can be sustained
as an equilibrium of the collusive supergame, and will indeed be sustained, being the
“best” (in the sense of aggregate profit maximizing) equilibrium.7
In the second country, 7 identical firms operate. The IR constraint for each indi-
vidual firm is (2) - the same as in the first country. However, as the number of firms
in the two markets differ, the minimum aggregate sustainable output in the second
market is (1 − δ) 73 a = 712 a - higher than the monopoly output a2 and lower than the
competitive output a. Therefore, in the second country, the monopoly outcome is not
an equilibrium of the game. The minimum aggregate sustainable output is in this case
also the supergame equilibrium output that maximizes aggregate profit, on which firms
coordinate. It follows that the optimal collusive output in the second country exceeds
the monopoly output, and the equilibrium price in this country is lower than monopoly
price.
Suppose now that, in order to strengthen competition, the two countries decide to
remove all of the barriers that separate the two markets. They then create an integrated
market. The new aggregate demand function is thus: Q = 2 (a − p). The 11 firms face
an infinite horizon and collude whenever rational. The individual rationality constraint
for the sustainability of the eleven-firm cartel is again given by (2).
The minimum aggregate sustainable output in the integrated market is then
(1 − δ) 11a3 = 1112 a, which is lower than the monopoly output a.
Therefore, in the interconnected market the monopoly output, and hence the monop-
oly price pmon = a2 , can be sustained.
The creation of an integrated market - far from bringing about more competition
- has “exported” the monopoly outcome from the first market into the second one.
Loosely speaking, the reason is that from the viewpoint of the country where seven
firms operate, the increase in market size due to integration is more important than
the increase in total capacity due to the additional firms, which are located abroad, but
which can now sell at home. The seven firms located in the second market are now
(i.e., after integration) able to divert part of their capacity to serve the first market,
where the monopoly price prevails. As a result, the decrease in the capacity utilized to
serve the second market allows them to sustain a monopoly outcome there. At the same
time, the first market (where only four firms are located) is able to absorb the extra
capacity, while preserving the monopoly outcome. Indeed, the new capacity available
for the first market (resulting from the sum of the capacity of the four firms and the
portion of capacity originated from the second market) is still lower than the threshold
below which the monopoly outcome may emerge as a supergame equilibrium.
7 Notice that - as proved by Brock and Scheinkman (1985) - with capacity constraints the collusive price
depends on capacity.
Also, observe that any other equilibrium price/output pair would not be “better” than the monopoly outcome,
as it would yield a lower aggregate profit.
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How general is this result? Is it pathological, or should it raise a genuine concern
in markets - such as electricity generation or railway transport - where capacity con-
straints are often binding in the equilibrium? We will show in the next sections condi-
tions under which this result may be obtained. This helps us understand how the inter-
play of market size, number of firms, and capacity levels can determine this outcome.
3 The model
A good is produced in two markets (e.g., two regions), labeled A and B. In region r
a given number of firms Nr ≥ 2 operates (with NA + NB = N ). The demand curve
for region r = A, B is Qr = Qr (pr ). It is constant across different time periods, and
it is decreasing, continuous, and differentiable. Its inverse is pr = pr (Qr ). Assume
the maximal willingness to pay is the same in both markets (i.e., pA (0) = pB (0)).8
If the good can be freely traded between the two markets (i.e., if they are perfectly
physically interconnected), in each period the market price is pic and total demand
(Qic = Q A + Q B) is Q (pic). Its inverse is given by: (Q A + Q B)−1 (pic).
Also, assume for simplicity that the demand functions are such that9 Qmonic ≤ QmonA +
QmonB . This assumption clearly holds, under the assumed common reservation price,
for linear demand functions (for which Qmonic = QmonA + QmonB ), and for a variety of
other specifications as well.10 Considering this assumption allows us to rule out situ-
ations in which interconnection may increase welfare simply because the monopoly
output absent price discrimination (i.e., with interconnection) is above the sum of the
optimal (monopoly) quantities under price discrimination (i.e., under two separate
markets).11
Firms are capacity constrained. All firms have the same capacity k. The assump-
tion of symmetric capacity across all firms was adopted for ease of exposition (see
Sect. 5 for a more detailed discussion of how asymmetries would modify the results).
The main result of the paper obtains even dispensing with that assumption (see Boffa
2006). More importantly, symmetric capacity implies that capacity is exogenous in
our model.
This assumption stems from two features of the recently liberalized utilities industry.
First, at the beginning of the liberalization process, capacity was generally distributed
to the various market players after a divestiture processes by the incumbent. Hence,
the endowment of capacity was not the result of previous choices of capacity accumu-
lation. Second, increasing capacity is a lengthy and costly venture due to the interplay
of many factors, including environmental concerns and the necessary compatibility of
the extra capacity with the existing transmission system (the issue becomes particu-
8 This assumption ensures continuity and differentiability of the demand function in the interconnected
market as well.
9 Notice that this assumption refers to the output levels that would emerge in the two markets under
monopoly prices, and not to equilibrium outputs.
10 For an extensive analysis of this, see Shih et al. (1988).
11 Observe that Qmonic ≤ QmonA + QmonB is a sufficient, yet not necessary, condition, for our main result(i.e., that interconnection reduces welfare) to hold.
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larly critical after liberalization, when the decisions on generation and on transmission
capacity are taken separately).
Firm i produces output qi at a constant marginal cost c up to capacity k and cannot
produce beyond it:
C
(
qi
)
=
{
cqi i f qi ≤ k
∞ i f qi > k
Competition takes place in prices over an infinite number of periods. If in any
period rationing occurs, it follows the efficient rationing rule, proposed by Levitan
and Shubik (1972). For ease of exposition, we assume throughout the paper that no
firm is essential for producing the market-wide competitive output both in A and in
B. That is,
(Nr − 1) k > Qr (c) (3)
This assumption, identified as the “non-essentiality condition”, or NEC, ensures
that no firm is essential for producing the competitive quantity. This is necessary for
the Bertrand equilibrium price in the static game pb to be set at pb = c. Hence, under
(3), Bertrand profit, and as a consequence the deviation profit, is null. This greatly
simplifies computations and in no way determines the qualitative nature of our result
(for a version of the paper where NEC assumption is relaxed, see Boffa 2006).
We compare two different scenarios. In the first one, markets are separated, while
in the second one A and B are interconnected into a single market. In each market
(indices omitted), the flow of profit of each firm i starting at a given t0 depends on a
demand function Qr (pr ), a constant marginal cost c, and the vector of prices of all
future periods.
Firms adopt a standard Bertrand-Nash reversion trigger strategy. At each t, the
price named by a firm i , pi,t , equals the collusive price pc if all firms operating in
that market named at t − 1 a price pi,t−1 equal to the collusive price (this implies as
well that market price pt−1r equals the collusive price pc). Otherwise, if, for some i ,
pi,t−1 < pc (i.e., if any firms defected at time t − 1 by undercutting the collusive
price), every firm i will charge the static Bertrand equilibrium price at time t (and the
static Bertrand will be the prevailing price at time t). Hence, pi,t = ptr = pb = c,
which obviously represents a credible punishment.
3.1 Equilibrium analysis: separated markets
We focus on characterizing equilibria in an oligopoly supergame when markets are
separate and firms are capacity constrained. Capacity constraints may generate two
effects. First, they limit the profit achievable by each firm in the collusive agreement
(however, this is not the case in our framework). Second, they make deviation from
the collusive agreement less attractive, as a deviating firm cannot serve the whole
market (this aspect is relevant to our analysis). As a consequence, they widen the set
of discount factors for which a cartel is sustainable.
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Moreover, unlike the case of collusion with unlimited capacity, when firms are
relatively small, the feasibility of collusion depends on the collusive price on which
firms coordinate. Hence, as shown by Brock and Scheinkman (1985), under capacity
constraints, it may well happen that collusion at the monopoly price pmon is not feasi-
ble, while a cartel coordinating at a lower price c < pc < pmon , an intermediate price
between the competitive and the monopoly ones, is. To see this, consider that for pc
to be an equilibrium price, the following has to hold:
qi (pc) (pc − c)
1 − δ ≥
(
pc − c) min (k, Q (pc)) (4)
where the optimal deviation price is arbitrarily close to the collusive price (we omitted
the subscript r for notational simplicity). Suppose that pc ≤ pmon and that the collu-
sive price is such that k < Q(pc). In this case, the optimal deviation output12 will be
qi = k, and (4) can be written as
qi (pc)
1 − δ ≥ k (5)
The IR constraint for sustainability of collusion depends on pc. It holds more easily
when pc is low and thus qi (pc) is large.
We can now characterize the equilibrium price in the oligopoly supergame in market
r , denoted by pcr , in the following:
Proposition 1 Under (3), the aggregate profit maximizing equilibrium price of the
supergame in market r for all t is:
pcr =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pmonr i f Nr≤
max
( Qr (pmonr )
k ,1
)
(1−δ)
pr (Nr k (1 − δ)) ∈ (c, pmonr ) i f
max
( Qr (pmonr )
k ,1
)
(1−δ) ≤Nr≤
max
( Qr (c)
k ,1
)
(1−δ)k
c i f Nr ≥
max
( Qr (c)
k ,1
)
(1−δ)k
(6)
See the Appendix for the proof.
Some comments are in order. Starting from the bottom of (6), as usual a very high
number of firms (relative to the discount factor) leads to a supergame equilibrium
which is a mere repetition of static Bertrand outcomes.
As the number of competitors decreases, output decreases and equilibrium price
increases until the monopoly level is reached. Firms will find it easier to sustain a
monopolistic cartel when the following holds:
• when capacity constraints do not matter, and the number of firms is sufficiently
small, in that each individual firm is able to supply the monopoly output (as in the
standard case of collusion);
12 Notice that in this case we will have rationing, with ki units sold at pc −  and others sold at pc . This
argument, which focuses on the incentive of firm i , does not depend on the rationing rule.
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• when capacity constraints matter, in that they do not allow any individual firm to
supply the monopolistic output, and aggregate capacity is sufficiently low.
Moreover, collusion arises at an intermediate price (between monopoly and com-
petition) if and only if the three following conditions hold simultaneously:
• firms are relatively numerous (so that, were they to have unlimited capacity, they
would not be able to sustain a cartel);
• capacity constraints are such that each individual firm cannot produce the compet-
itive outcome (this condition is represented by k < Qr (c), which holds in (6)),
when pmon > pc > c; 13
• aggregate capacity is above discounted monopoly, but below the discounted com-
petition level (otherwise, they would find it rational to produce the Bertrand output).
4 Integration and welfare reduction
Having discussed the equilibrium in an isolated market, we now turn to consider the
effects of integrating the two markets. Our goal consists in showing that interconnec-
tion may, for certain values of the parameters, reduce welfare.
We begin by characterizing the outcome of the dynamic game when the two markets
are integrated. In this case, we only have one price, pic.
Under our usual assumption that condition (3) holds in both markets, the collu-
sive price in the supergame played by N firms in the interconnected market is the
following:14
pcic =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pmonic i f N ≤
max
(
(Q A+Q B )(pmonic )
k ,1
)
(1−δ)
p (Nk (1 − δ)) i f
max
(
(Q A+Q B )(pmonic )
k ,1
)
(1−δ) < N ≤
max
(
(Q A+Q B )(c)
k ,1
)
(1−δ)k
c i f N > max
(
(Q A+Q B )(c)
k ,1
)
(1−δ)
(7)
As for the relationship between integrated (collusive) price and the (collusive) prices
in the separated markets, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 If the NEC condition (3) holds, pcic ≤ max
(
pcA, p
c
B
)
, i.e., the price in
the interconnected market has to be lower or equal to the higher of the prices in the
two nodes.
The proof is reported in the Appendix.
The Proposition shows that the price cannot strictly increase in both markets. How-
ever, this does not exclude the event that the price increases in one market, while
remaining constant in the other one. We explore this occurrence in the next section.
13 If this condition did not hold, we would revert back to the standard case of no capacity constraints.
14 The proof of this statement would be a trivial replica of the proof of Proposition 1 and is thus omitted.
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Total surplus in market r is T Sr , the sum of consumer surplus C Sr and aggregate
profit r . Hence, total surplus is: T Sr =
∫ Qr
v=0 pr (ν) dν − cQr (pr ).
The computation of total surplus in market B is analogous. In the interconnected
market: T Sic =
∫ Qic
v=0 pic (ν) dν − cQic(pic).
Interconnection lowers total welfare if and only if:
T SA + T SB > T Sic
We now investigate a sufficient condition under which this may happen.
Remark 3 As long as pA = pB, a sufficient condition for T Sic < T SA + T SB is that
pic ≥ max (pB, pA)
Under this condition welfare is not increased in either market. Obviously, given
Proposition 2, the only relevant case is the one where pic = max (pB, pA). However,
could such a price be the outcome of integration?
In what follows, we provide sufficient conditions under which interconnection in-
creases the price in one market, while leaves it unaltered in the other one. Export of
collusion results from the interplay between collusive output and aggregate capacity.
If the relationship were linear, collusive output in the integrated market would simply
equal the sum of the collusive outputs in the non-integrated markets, and the price
would be an average. However, the non-linearity broadens the set of possible out-
comes, and makes it possible that price in the interconnected market equals the higher
of the two prices.
Exporting collusion The ability to collude mainly depends on two countervailing
factors. First, it depends on the number of firms, which increases with interconnection.
This makes collusion harder in the interconnected market (pro-competitive effect), and
tends to raise welfare.
Second, it depends on the relationship between aggregate capacity and the size of
the market both with separation and with integration. Aggregate capacity determines
the minimum output (i.e., the maximum price) that can be sustained in the collusive
agreement, when the capacity constraint does not allow any single firm to produce by
itself the monopoly output (possibly anti-competitive effect).
The reason why this happens may be better understood by the example provided
in Sect. 2. Intuitively, collusion is being exported from the market with the smallest
number of firms to the integrated market. The following proposition characterizes a
set of sufficient conditions under which collusion is exported.
Proposition 4 Suppose pcA = pmonA and pcB < pmonB . A sufficient condition for inter-
connection to reduce overall welfare is:
N ∈
⎛
⎜⎝ Q A (c) + Q B (c) + kk ;
max
(
(Q A+Q B )(pmonic )
k , 1
)
(1 − δ)
⎞
⎟⎠ (8)
and there are always parameters configurations, such that this interval is not empty.
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Proof For pcA = pmonA we must have Q A(c)+kk ≤ NA ≤
max
(
Q A(pmonA )
k ,1
)
(1−δ) , while for
pcB to be lower than monopoly price p
mon
B we must have NB >
max
(
Q B(pmonB )
k ,1
)
(1−δ) . If (8)
holds, then pcic = pmonic , which by the previous Remark implies that interconnection
has reduced welfare. The only thing to prove is that the set of parameters for which
these prices are equilibrium prices is non-empty.
Assume k < min
(Q A
(
pmonA
)
, Q B
(
pmonB
))
. It has to be Q A(c)+kk ≤ NA ≤
Q A(pmonA )
k(1−δ)
and Q B(p
mon
B )
k(1−δ) < NB <
Q B (c)
k(1−δ) . For there to be a set of values for which (8) holds true,
one needs
Q (c) + k
k
≤ Q A
(
pmonA
)
k (1 − δ)
which becomes
k ≤ Q A
(
pmonA
)
(1 − δ) − Q (c)
which certainly holds for pcA = pmonA to be true. Q.E.D. 	unionsq
The implication of this result is that there is always a non empty set of parameters,
such that if two markets are interconnected, firms may end up coordinating on the
higher of the two previous prices. In this way, the high price country exports (very
effective) collusion into the country where collusion was relatively less damaging.15
To provide an intuition for this result, notice that the outcome of the game depends
on the relationship between aggregate capacity and market size.16 In this environ-
ment, there may exist situations in which the two isolated markets sustain different
outcomes. In market A aggregate capacity is smaller, and as a result monopoly pricing
emerges. Notice that it may be the case that a small increase in the number of firms
operating in market A does not affect this outcome: in other words, even with (a little)
extra capacity, monopoly would prevail. Market B has a larger number of firms, with
too much available capacity to be able to sustain collusion at monopoly price.
After integration, we may think of firms operating in the market B to split into
two groups. One serves customers located in market B, and this group is composed
of exactly the number of firms that allows the monopolistic outcome to prevail in this
market. The other group serves customers in market A, thus providing this market with
extra capacity, but not enough to thwart the emergence of the monopolistic outcome in
the market A. We can view interconnection as a way to shift capacity from one group
of customers to the other in order to “better” exploit the collusive potential offered by
the dynamic game.
15 Observe that this result requires one of the two pre-integration prices to be set at the monopoly level.
Monopoly price ensures that the market is able to absorb part of the excess capacity of the other market.
16 Given our assumption on symmetric capacity, heterogeneity in aggregate capacity is generated by
changes in the number of firms.
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A linear example Two crucial questions related to the set of parameters compatible
with this result are the following: How large is the set of parameters? How plausible
is it in actual episodes of interconnection? Let us generalize slightly our previous
example in order to provide some insights into these issues.
Consider again two markets with linear demand functions, pr = a − br Qr , r =
A, B. In market r , Nr firms operate. Firm i in market r has capacity kir and produces
with a constant marginal cost c. We relax the assumption of symmetric capacity across
all firms, and we assume that in each market, i = 1, 2, ..., Nr with k1r ≥ k2r ≥ · · · ≥
k Nrr . Total capacity in market r is Kr , with K ≡ K A + K B .
In line with the previous analysis, we assume that in each market no firm (including
firm 1, the largest one) has a sufficient capacity to produce more than the monopoly
output: k1r ≤ Qmonr = a−c2br . We also assume that in each market condition (3) holds,
which we may write as
Nr∑
i=2
kir > Qr (c).
In this setting, the monopoly price in both regional markets, as well as in the inter-
connected market, is a+c2 . Define as ξr ≡ a−c2br − (1 − δ) Kr the difference between
the monopoly output and aggregate capacity in market r .17 Similarly, in the inter-
connected market, ξic ≡ Qmonic − (1 − δ) (K A + K B) = (a−c)(bA+bB )2bAbB − (1 − δ) K .18
Observe that, since Qmonic = QmonA + QmonB , then ξic = ξA + ξB .
In order for interconnection to “export” collusion, the following condition19 must
hold:
ξA > 0, ξB < 0 and ξic = ξA + ξB ≥ 0 (9)
Observe that ξr increases when demand increases (i.e., when the monopoly output
increases), and/or when the aggregate capacity decreases. From (9), one can see that
our result requires both an asymmetric ξm across markets, and a high level of ξic. If
we start from a situation in which the result holds (where ξA > 0, ξB < 0 and ξic ≥ 0),
a decrease in ξB , entailed by a fall in QmonB , or by an increase in K B , may have two
effects.
First, it decreases the likelihood that our result (i.e., that collusion is exported from
an individual market to the integrated environment) holds; indeed, one needs more
room for new capacity in market A, (i.e., a higher ξA), to compensate for the decrease
in ξB . Second, when this happens (ξic ≥ 0), the welfare reduction effect of intercon-
nection is very significant.
On the contrary, when ξA > 0, ξB < 0 and ξic is negative, but close to zero (thus, col-
lusion at the monopoly price is not feasible in the interconnected market), an increase
in either ξA or ξB , sufficient to bring ξic in the positive realm, while preserving a
negative ξB , extends the monopolistic collusion to the integrated market.
17 Observe that the equilibrium outcome is monopoly when ξr > 0, while it is between monopoly and
competition if ξr < 0.
18 As a reminder, N = NA + NB
19 Without loss of generality, we assume that ξA > ξB ; market A is thus the market with (relatively) smaller
installed capacity.
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More specifically, given the definition of ξm , the first part of condition (9) may be
written a−c2(1−δ) ∈ (bA K A; bB K B).
The larger the difference bB K B − bA K A, the larger the likelihood to observe our
result. This difference may reflect heterogeneity in capacity or in market size (indexed
by bA and bB). Whether heterogeneous capacity levels are due to cross-country dif-
ferences in the past technological choices (plant sizes), or in the number of firms in
the two markets, does not matter for our result.
As mentioned in Sect. 1.1, the electricity interconnection between Italy and France
(in the years 2004-2005) provides a good example for parameter values that fit our
results of export of monopolistic collusion. Reconsidering the example in the light
of the notation introduced in this paragraph, according to our hypothesis, France (F)
had ξF < 0 (its substantial capacity with respect to demand was hindering monop-
olistic collusion), Italy (I ) had ξI > 0 (low capacity with respect to demand), and
ξic = ξF + ξI ≥ 0 (Italy had enough “room” to host the French excess capacity, and
this opportunity was exploited after integration).
The set of parameter values for which integration exports monopoly collusion
and reduces welfare is limited. In other cases, interconnection may, on the contrary,
enhance welfare (contrary to the results in Bernheim and Whinston 1990, but in line
with the standard results in the international trade literature). Consider the same envi-
ronment as above, but suppose that both ξA and ξB are negative (hence their sum is
negative as well), and both markets are colluding at an intermediate price between
monopoly and competition. Under such circumstances, the total quantity produced
after interconnection is the same as the sum of the quantities produced in the two indi-
vidual markets. However, in the integrated market, output is allocated to consumers
with the highest marginal valuations, thereby generating a higher welfare.
4.1 A few open issues
It may be useful to discuss briefly some of our assumptions, and illustrate their impact
on our results.
The assumption of exogenous capacity confines our analysis to the short run, as
increasing capacity is a lengthy, costly, and difficult venture due to the interplay of
various factors, including environmental concerns and the necessary compatibility of
the extra capacity with the existing transmission system (the issue becomes particu-
larly critical after liberalization, when the decisions on generation and on transmission
capacity are taken separately). Furthermore, prior to liberalization, the incumbent’s
capacity was presumably not built in the anticipation of future competition. Thus, the
available capacity right after liberalization can safely be regarded as an exogenous
variable.
Therefore, we present here a short-run effect. If interconnection encourages entry,20
it may well happen that prices decrease after an initial phase. The implication of our
analysis can thus be regarded from a different perspective. An immediate increase in
prices after interconnection should not be interpreted as an indicator that market open-
20 The results when entry is allowed depend on the shape of the cost functions.
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ing is “bad”. Indeed, the beneficial effects of interconnection may emerge only in the
long-run, thanks to entry. In this sense, market opening and policies aimed at encour-
aging entry are not substitutes, in that market opening may be totally unsuccessful
without further entry.
Moreover, in our model firms hold excess capacity. This is a typical feature of elec-
tricity markets: Electricity cannot be stored and its demand varies, so that a substantial
reserve margin is almost always observed. In particular, at peak times capacity may
only slightly exceed demand, while in base hours the bulk of capacity may remain
idle. Notice that it may well happen that collusion is sustainable in some sub-markets
(peak times) but less so in parts of the day where excess capacity is instead excessively
large.21
As shown in the previous example, the assumption of symmetric capacity has been
introduced for simplicity only. As long as each firm’s individual capacity is small
enough, namely that (3) holds, and that each firm’s capacity is lower than the monop-
oly outcome, our results hold.22
5 Conclusions
In recent years, a strong policy orientation in favor of market integration and physical
interconnection in network markets has emerged both in Europe and in the United
States. However, some anecdotal evidence suggests that an increase in interconnec-
tion capacity may induce price increases. The received literature offers some possible
explanations for the result. However, none of them appears to capture satisfacto-
rily the peculiarities of network markets. Our paper offers an alternative explanation,
based on a framework and a set of assumptions (capacity constraints and dynamic
game) chosen to fit the electricity industry - both its structural properties, and its
recent transition from a vertically integrated monopoly to a disintegrated liberalized
industry.
Without integration, one market may be charaterised by a collusive (monopoly)
price, while in the other one, capacity may be so large that such an outcome is impos-
sible. However, when the markets are interconnected, the “excess” capacity in the
second market may be diverted to the first one. Monopoly price might thus prevail in
the integrated market, so that monopoly would be “exported” from the first market to
the second one.
Although most of the analysis is carried out under the assumption of symmetric
capacity, it is easy to see that nothing substantial would change, if we relaxed such
an assumption by introducing the possibility of differences in firms’ capacities.23 The
21 Given the non- storability of electricity, national authorities have often opted for a definition of the
electricity market(s) conditional on the parts of the day and thus on demand levels.
22 With minor alterations to the model, the results could still hold for some parameter values even dispens-
ing with the NEC conditions, and with the assumption that each firm’s capacity is lower than the monopoly
outcome. For more details on this and other possible extensions of the present model, see Boffa (2006).
23 If, in a context of asymmetric capacity, no firm’s capacity exceeds the monopoly output of each market,
the results of the paper extend in a straightforward way; otherwise, a more complicated analysis is required.
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paper has focused on capacity constraints, and not on increasing cost functions both for
expositional simplicity, and to fit a specific feature of the electricity markets. However,
as increasing cost functions possess most of the qualitative properties of capacity con-
straints, most of the results hold even in the case of continuously increasing cost
functions.24
Moreover, given our interest in showing that the effect of market integration on
welfare is not unambiguous, we have only provided sufficient conditions for welfare
reduction (due to the diffusion of collusion after market integration). The fact that
there is always a set of parameters that may satisfy such conditions is a striking fea-
ture of our result. A further step might consist in a more precise assessment of the
welfare effects of interconnection according to different parameter values of demand,
cost, discount factor, and capacity (both individual and aggregate), reflecting differ-
ent pre-interconnection market structures. Such classification may provide valuable
information to policy makers facing interconnection prospects.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 A collusive agreement in market r is sustainable if and only if
qi(pcr )(pcr −c)
(1−δ) ≥
(
pcr − c
)
min
(
k, Qr
(
pcr
))
, i.e. qi
(
pcr
) ≥ (1 − δ) min (k, Nr qi
(
pcr
))
.
Assume first
min
(
k, Nr qi
(
pcr
)) = k (10)
i.e., no firm has sufficient capacity to produce the whole collusive equilibrium output.
Under this assumption, a collusive agreement requires qi
(
pcr
) ≥ (1 − δ) k, and the
equilibrium price that maximizes aggregate profit is then pcr if k ≤ Qr
(
pcr
)
where:
pcr
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pmonr if (1 − δ) Nr k ≤ Qr
(
pmonr
)
and k ≤ Qr
(
pmonr
)
pr ((1 − δ) Nr k ) if Qr
(
pmonr
) ≤ (1 − δ) Nr k ≤ Qr (c) and k ≤ (1 − δ) Nr k ⇒ Nr ≥ 1(1−δ)
c if Qr (c) ≤ (1 − δ) Nr k and k ≤ (1 − δ) Nr k ⇒ Nr ≥ 1(1−δ)
(11)
Assume now min
(
k, Nr qi
(
pcr
)) = Nr qi
(
pcr
)
, i.e., each individual firm has suf-
ficient capacity to produce the entire collusive equilibrium outcome. In such case,
we revert back to the standard IR constraint for collusion when firms have unlimited
capacity, which entails:
24 For a review of, among others, tacit collusion with increasing cost function, see Ivaldi et al. (2003).
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pcr =
{
∈ [c, pmonr
]
if Nr ≤ 1(1−δ)
c if Nr ≥ 1(1−δ)
(12)
Combining (11) and (12), one obtains the aggregate profit maximizing equilibrium
of the supergame. We start by conditions under which a cartel coordinating on monop-
oly price can be sustained:
pcr = pmonr if i. OR ii. OR iii. holds :
i. Nr≤ 1(1−δ) and k≤Qr
(
pmonr
)
ii. Nr≤ Qr(p
mon
r )
(1−δ)k and Nr ≥ 1(1−δ)
iii. Nr≤ 1(1−δ) and k ≥ Qr
(
pmonr
)(13)
This may be rewritten as:
pcr = pmonr if i. OR ii. holds :
{
i. Nr ≤ 1(1−δ)
ii. 1
(1−δ) ≤ Nr ≤ Qr(p
mon
r )
(1−δ)k
pcr = pmonr if Nr ≤
max
( Qr(pmonr )
k , 1
)
(1 − δ)
Now, by combining (11) and (12), we examine conditions under which an intermediate
price between monopoly and competition emerges as the aggregate profit maximizing
supergame equilibrium: pcr = pr ((1 − δ) Nr k ) if Qr(p
mon
r )
(1−δ)k ≤ Nr ≤ Qr (c)(1−δ)k and Nr ≥
1
(1−δ) .
This may be rewritten as:25
pcr = pr ((1 − δ) Nr k ) if
max
(
1, Qr(p
mon
r )
k
)
(1 − δ) ≤ Nr ≤
max
(
1, Qr (c)k
)
(1 − δ) k (14)
Finally, again by combining (11) and (12), we check under what conditions collu-
sion cannot be sustained, and competitive price is prevailing:
pcr = c if i. OR ii. holds :
{
i. Qr (c)k(1−δ) ≤ Nr and 1(1−δ) ≤ Nr
ii. Nr ≥ 1(1−δ) and 1(1−δ) ≥ Nr
(15)
Rewriting (15), we obtain:
pcr = c if Nr ≥
max
(
Qr (c)
k , 1
)
(1 − δ)
	unionsq
25 Notice that the collusion at an intermediate price with δ ≥ Nr −1Nr and k ≥ Qcr , in spite of being an equi-
librium, is never part of an aggregate profit maximizing equilibrium. Indeed, when δ ≥ Nr −1Nr and k ≥ Qcrfirms can sustain a cartel at a monopoly price, and this maximizes their profit.
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Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose the contrary; i.e., that pcic > max
(
pcA, p
c
B
)
. For that
to be true, pcic > c, hence either p
c
ic =pmonic or pmonic > pcic > c. Assume first pcic=pmonic .
Then, it has to be that pcA, p
c
B < p
mon
ic = pmonA = pmonB .26
pcA, p
c
B < p
mon
ic = pmonA = pmonB requires:
Nr >
max
( Qr(pmonr )
k , 1
)
(1 − δ) , r = A, B (16)
while pcic = pmonic requires
N ≤
max
(
(Q A+Q B )(pmonic )
k , 1
)
(1 − δ) (17)
By (16), it follows that N = NA + NB >
max
(
Q A(pmonA )
k ,1
)
(1−δ) +
max
(
Q B(pmonB )
k ,1
)
(1−δ) ≥
max
(
(Q A+Q B )(pmonic )
k ,1
)
(1−δ) , since (Q A + Q B)
(
pmonic
) ≤ Q A
(
pmonA
) + Q B
(
pmonB
)
, by
assumption. Hence, N >
max
(
(Q A+Q B )(pmonic )
k ,1
)
(1−δ) , in contradiction with (17).
Assume now pmonic > p
c
ic > c. The requirement that p
c
ic > max
(
pcA, p
c
B
)
entails
pcic >
(
pcA, p
c
B
)
.
pmonic > p
c
ic > c requires
pcic = p (Nk (1 − δ)) if
max
(
(Q A+Q B )(pmonic )
k , 1
)
(1 − δ) < N ≤
max
(
(Q A+Q B )(c)
k , 1
)
(1 − δ) k
while pcic >
(
pcA, p
c
B
)
requires
pcA =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p (NAk (1 − δ)) if
max
(
Q A(pmonA )
k ,1
)
(1−δ) ≤ NA ≤
max
( Q A(c)
k ,1
)
(1−δ)
c if NA ≥
max
( Q A(c)
k ,1
)
(1−δ)
pcB
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
p (NBk (1 − δ)) if
max
(
Q B(pmonB )
k ,1
)
(1−δ) ≤ NB ≤
max
( Q B (c)
k ,1
)
(1−δ)
c if NB ≥
max
( Q B (c)
k ,1
)
(1−δ)
26 Notice that, given our assumption on equal reservation prices in markets A and B (and as a consequence
in the interconnected market), pmonA = pmonB = pmonic
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Assuming
max
(
Q A(pmonA )
k ,1
)
(1−δ) ≤ NA ≤
max
( Q A(c)
k ,1
)
(1−δ) and
max
(
Q B(pmonB )
k ,1
)
(1−δ) ≤ NB ≤
max
( Q B (c)
k ,1
)
(1−δ) , then Qcic = (NA + NB) k (1 − δ) = qA
(
pcA
)+qB
(
pcB
) = NAk (1 − δ)
+ NBk (1 − δ).
Hence, if pcA = pcB , then pcic = pcA = pcB ; if pcA = pcB , then pcic is at an interme-
diate level between pcA and p
c
B , so p
c
ic ≤ max
{
pcA; pcB
}
. This is a contradiction with
pcic > max
{
pcA; pcB
}
. If we assume that the supergame equilibrium entails the com-
petitive outcome in one of the markets (say, without loss of generality, market A), then
NA ≥
max
( Q A(c)
k ,1
)
(1−δ) . Hence, Qcic = (NA + NB) k (1 − δ) ≤ NBk (1 − δ) + Q A (c).
In this case, one of the separate markets (say, without loss of generality, A) has
pcA = c. Since pcic > c, then it has to be that pcic < pcB . This is a contradiction with
pcic > max
{
pcA; pcB
}
. 	unionsq
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